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美国网民热议:中国可以从尼克松那学到什么?


译者:unknown     发布时间:2016-03-25     超过 0 位网友阅读

对,这和美国在二十世纪早期并不被人们视为超级大国是一样的

原文地址:http://www.theatlantic.com


The country’s growth is slowing. The wrong response might make the problem worse.

中国经济的增长正在放缓。而错误的应对措施可能会让状况变得更糟。

An anxious superpower is confounded by a troubled economy. For a generation, its growth has been envied; now that growth is decelerating sharply. For decades, it has shaped and guided its economy via tight control of its banks; now that lever is malfunctioning. For years, it has carefully managed its exchange rate and limited the flow of capital across its borders; now the dam is cracking. To anyone who keeps up with the news, the superpower would seem easy to identify: China. But for those with a long memory, it could just as well be the United States of the Nixon era.

一个忧心忡忡的超级大国正为它陷入困境的经济而困扰。整整一代人以来,它的增长被世界羡慕;而现在那个增速正在大幅下降。几十年间,它用对银行的强力管制塑造和指导了它的经济;而现在那个手段正在失效。多年以来,它小心翼翼地保持着自己的汇率和受限制的国际资本流动;而现在那个货币堤坝正在溃决。对于任何关心时事的人来说,这个超级大国很好辨认:中国。但是对于那些有长久记忆的人来说,它也可以是尼克松时代的美利坚合众国。

Like China today, the United States of the 1970s experienced an abrupt economic slowdown. Its economy had expanded by 4.4 percent a year, on average, during the go-go ’50s and ’60s, but growth slowed by about one-quarter during the following decade, to 3.2 percent a year. Even though growth of more than 3 percent may sound robust by today’s standards, at the time it felt ghastly. Time magazine lamented in 1974 that “middle-class people are being pushed into such demeaning economies as buying clothes at rummage sales”; a year or so later, its cover asked, “Can Capitalism Survive?” In September 1975, after President Gerald Ford survived two attempts on his life in quick succession, an adviser named Alan Greenspan responded with a memo about the “nihilism, radicalism, and violence” that seemed to grip some Americans. When New York City flirted with bankruptcy, its plight was taken as a symbol of broader moral and cultural decay.

如同今天的中国,美国在上个世纪70年代经历了一次突如其来的的经济减速。美国经济在活跃的上世纪50年代到60年代平均年增长4.4%,但是其后的十年间增长速度下降了四分之一到每年3.2%。尽管每年高于3%的增长以今天的标准看来很强劲,但是在那个年代是让人感觉极差的。《时代》周刊在1974年哀叹道:“中产阶级被迫陷入如此有失颜面的经济状况,以至于要趁着清仓拍卖买衣服”;一年左右之后,它的封面问道:“资本主义能生存下来吗?”1975年9月,在总统杰拉尔德·福特完成了他人生中的两次快速继任后,一个名叫艾伦·格林斯潘的顾问提出了关于“虚无主义、激进主义和暴力”的备忘录似乎获得了一些美国人的支持。当纽约市徘徊在破产边缘之时,它的处境被当作一个更广泛的道德文化衰退的象征。

If China’s slowdown were temporary, this might not matter much. But the country’s deceleration is likely to become more severe. China’s growth has been founded upon exports, yet there is a limit to how much China’s trade surplus can expand without triggering a protectionist backlash. China’s growth has also been powered by favorable demography, but as today’s missing children become tomorrow’s missing adults, the ratio of workers to dependents will deteriorate and the demographic dividend will give way to a demographic tax. Most crucially of all, China’s growth has been built on an extraordinary level of investment, recently financed by an extraordinary level of debt. But, as we shall see presently, this road to riches leads over a cliff. China’s economic miracle is very likely at its end.

如果中国的经济减缓只是暂时的,那这些或许并不是大问题。但是中国的经济减速问题看起来似乎愈演愈烈。中国的经济增长建立在出口贸易上,但目前中国贸易顺差的程度仍然受到限制,否则就会受到贸易保护主义的反弹。中国的经济增长也得益于其人口数量,但随着中国婴孩数量的减少,意味着成年人口的减少,也就是说劳动人口和需供养人口之比将会恶化并且人口红利将让位于人口重负。最为关键的是,中国的经济增长建立在一个格外高层次的投资水平上,最近这些高规模的投资资金是大举负债筹得的。但是,正如我们现在所看到的,这条通往发达的道路通到了悬崖边。中国的经济奇迹很可能就要结束了。

Downshifting is always painful, but politicians often make it more painful—and ultimately more destabilizing—than it needs to be. That was certainly the case in the U.S. in the 1970s, and Chinese leaders would do well to learn from America’s experience. The first and most important lesson is to accept the slowdown gracefully. Denial and resistance only make the problems worse.

换档减速总是痛苦的,但政客们时常会让其更为痛苦——并且最终使其更具有破坏性。1970年代的美国就是这么一个例子,中国的领导层将会从美国的经历中得到许多有用的教训。第一个,而且也是最重要的教训是,淡定地接受经济减缓的事实。拒绝以及反抗只会让问题更为糟糕。

Like China’s current leadership, Richard Nixon feared the political fallout from a slowdown, and so resisted hard. He bullied the Federal Reserve into conjuring up a stimulus, just as China’s ruling State Council recently directed the People’s Bank of China to cut interest rates. He propped up the defense contractor Lockheed, much as China’s government supports large state-owned enterprises. He unleashed government-sponsored lenders to shovel credit into the economy—for the mortgage-finance companies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, substitute China’s state-owned banking behemoths.

就像目前中国的现任领导层一样,理查德.尼克松害怕从经济减缓中失势,对经济减缓十分抵触。他威胁美联储出台经济刺激政策的做法,正如中国的国务院指示中国人民银行降低利率一样。尼克松为国防承包商洛克希德·马丁公司撑腰的做法,与中国政府支持大型国有企业十分相似。尼克松放宽了对政府扶持的抵押贷款公司的限制,使贷款公司将贷款都投入了经济之中——Fannie Mae 和 Freddie Mac这两家美国政府扶持的抵押贷款公司替换成中国的国有银行巨头们,毫无违和感。

China’s society is already under acute stress.

中国社会已经处于巨大的压力之中。

The second American lesson for China concerns financial reform. Again, this was a challenge Nixon refused to face squarely, even though most economists urged him to be bold. By the time of his inauguration, America’s outdated system of capping bank-deposit rates—the same sort of system that still exists in China—had been rendered dysfunctional, and for reasons that contemporary China watchers would quickly recognize. Once upon a time, the caps had usefully forced down banks’ cost of capital, allowing them to make cheap loans to the industries that fueled growth. But as the U.S. economy developed and the financial system grew more sophisticated, new types of savings vehicles sprang up, offering market-linked interest payments; because those market rates were more attractive, savers voted with their wallets. As deposits migrated from banks to upstart rivals, small businesses, which relied on bank loans, found credit hard to come by. Home buyers faced a similar credit crunch.

中国要学习的第二个美国教训是-金融改革。当金融改革的挑战来临时,尼克松又一次选择拒绝直接面对,即便大多数经济学家要求他大胆一点。在尼克松的就职典礼举行的那个年代,美国已过时的限制银行存款利率的系统——这种过时的系统在中国仍然存在——就已经呈现出不对劲了,而出于各种原因,当代的中国观察家们也会迅速的发现这个系统的问题。之前有段时间,这个上限机制有效地压下了银行的资金成本,使得他们可以低息贷款给工厂,为经济增长加油。但随着美国的经济发展以及金融系统愈加的复杂,新生代的储蓄工具大量出现,提供各式各样的市场化的利息支付;而因为这些储蓄工具的市场汇率更具吸引力,客户更愿意把钱存在它们那里。随着存款从银行转移至这些崛起的新生代金融工具,那些依赖银行贷款的小本生意发现很难贷到款了。而买房者也面临同样的信贷危机。

Acknowledging the case for change, Nixon appointed a financial-reform commission in 1970. But the president found the commission’s ideas toxic. “There’s going to be a lot of crockery broken,” a White House aide warned him: The reformers were suggesting freer competition, which would end the credit droughts in key patches of the economy—but also push weaker (yet politically vocal) lenders to the wall. Seldom eager to elevate principle above politics, Nixon decided to do nothing. In the absence of an intelligent reform plan, finance was left to modernize haphazardly. Excluded by regulation from the mortgage business, banks experimented with foreign ventures—and squandered their shareholders’ capital on drunken Latin American lending. Unable to coast on cheap deposits, savings-and-loan associations tried to compensate with racier investments. The resulting savings-and-loan crisis would eventually cost U.S. taxpayers more than $100 billion.

在承认事情有变之后,1970年,尼克松任命了一个金融改革委员会。但这名总统发现这个委员会的想法有毒。“大量的陶器将会打碎,”一名白宫助手警告他:这些改革者正在建议让竞争更加自由化,认为这份自由将会成为美国经济的关键补丁并且终止信贷危机——但这同样会将较弱(政治上的说法)的出借人逼向墙角。尼克松几乎从未想过将原则提升至比政治还高的觉悟水平,因此他决定什么都不做。由于缺乏指引方向的改革方案,美国的金融业就这样被丢在那让其自身杂乱无章的现代化。因为没有来自抵押贷款业务的监管,银行开始进行海外的冒险试验——并且浪费他们股东的资金,将这些钱贷款至扶不起墙的拉丁美洲。由于无法从稀少的存款中获得好处,存款和贷款机构就用活泼的投资来进行补偿。由此而导致的储蓄贷款危机将最终使得美国的纳税者付出超过1千亿美元的代价。

China today is in a similar quandary. Caps on deposit interest rates allow banks to vacuum up cheap capital and lend it to favored companies; if the government messes with this system, much crockery will be broken. But the status quo is unsustainable. The artificially low returns to savers represent a vast hidden tax on Chinese families, crimping consumption and forcing China to rely unhealthily on investment spending to power growth. And because politics determines who gets the cheap loans that are made possible by capped deposit rates, capital flows to political cronies rather than to the innovators who have the best ideas. The result is a machine for expropriating savers and then squandering the proceeds. Sooner rather than later, China needs a financial system that generates fewer bad loans, makes better use of savings, and frees consumers to become the engine of the nation’s economic growth.

中国如今面临相似的困境。存款利率的上限使得银行可以以低息贷款给自己偏好的公司;如果政府干扰存款利率上限系统,更多的瓷器将会被打碎,但是以中国目前的现状来说是承受不住的。人为操控的对储户的低回报率意味着对中国众多家庭变相征收巨大的隐蔽税,且抑制了民众消费以及促使中国病态地依赖投资来发展其经济。而且由于是从政治上来决定谁可以从存款利率上限机制中获得低息贷款,资金就流向了与政府亲密的公司手中而不是那些拥有绝妙点子的创新者。结果就相当于产生了一台不断吸取储户存款并且浪费储户收益的机器。总之越早越好,中国需要一个产生较少低质量贷款业务的金融系统,让存款得到更好的应用,以及释放民众的消费能力,让民众消费成为中国经济发展的引擎。

The final American lesson for China concerns the exchange rate. In the postwar era, the United States pegged its currency to gold, much as in recent years China has mostly pegged its currency to the dollar. But in August 1971, as part of his attempt to boost growth, Nixon abandoned the gold link, allowing the dollar to fall precipitously against the currencies of America’s trading partners. China now seems tempted to pursue a cautious version of this strategy, and for similar reasons: Duing a currency and thereby boosting exports is seductive. But exchange-rate regimes work best when a currency is either truly fixed to a peg or allowed to float freely; the middle ground is treacherous. If a country begins duation but stops short of allowing its currency to reach its natural level, investors will expect the currency’s value to fall further, and will therefore withdraw money from the country. As that happens, their expectations may well become self-fulfilling.

中国要学习的最后一个美国教训是-汇率。在二战后,美国将其货币与黄金挂钩,与中国近些年来将其货币与美元挂钩相似。但在1971年的八月份,作为促进经济发展的一个策略,尼克松让美元与黄金脱钩,使得美元对美国贸易伙伴货币的兑率急剧下跌。目前看来,中国似乎出于相似的原因也会使用这个策略,但会采取更谨慎的做法:让货币贬值以促进出口是诱人的做法。但是汇率机制只有在货币挂钩或允许汇率自由浮动的情况下才运作得最好;采取中间做法是不可取的。如果一个国家的货币开始贬值但是却并不让其达到自然水平,那么投资者们便会预想这个国家的货币价值将会下跌的更多,然后就会从这个国家撤出资金。就算他们预想的状况是错的,当他们收回投资时,假戏也就真做了。

Nixon thought he could follow duation with a new, refixed exchange rate. But his efforts failed embarrassingly, compounding the volatility of the dollar. Likewise, China discovered last summer that a modest depreciation can create expectations of more depreciation, triggering a burst of capital flight. A renewed exodus of money in November suggested that the danger was still present. The currency turmoil in January underscored the point.

尼克松认为他可以通过货币贬值来获得一个全新的、经过修正的汇率。可惜他的努力全都尴尬的失败了,反而加剧了美元的波动。类似的,中国在上一年夏季发现,适度的货币贬值反而会造成人们产生货币会贬值更多的预想,从而引起资本外逃。上一年十一月份新一轮的资本外逃表明了此问题仍然存在。而今年一月份的货币混乱继续强调了这一点。

Nixon’s setbacks in the 1970s serve to remind Westerners not to judge others too arrogantly. But at the same time, they stand as a warning. When navigating big economic transitions, halfhearted policy adjustments are usually inadequate, and the costs of timidity will be more than just financial. In the U.S. the costs included a decline of public trust in institutions, a spate of national self-questioning, and eventually an embrace of radical remedies: aggressive deregulation, monetarism, deficit-fueling tax cuts. If China cannot navigate its deceleration more deftly, Xi’s successor may one day be reduced to addressing his countrymen about lost national confidence. Perhaps a Chinese magazine will even pose the question “Can Communism Survive?”

尼克松1970年的挫败倒是提醒了西方人:不要太自大地判断他人。然而同时,尼克松的挫败也是一个警告世人的例子。当操纵一个巨大经济体的转向时,漫不经心的政策调整是往往不足够的,而且这种胆怯做法的代价可不仅仅只在金融上。在美国,这个代价包括了公众对政府信任程度的下降,大规模的国家自我反省,以及最后激进的补救措施:大量的放松管制、货币主义、赤字加剧还有减税。若是中国不能够更加灵敏地操控其经济的减缓,习之后的下一任主席或许有天将不得不像吉米卡特一样对他的国民发表“萎靡演讲”。或许中国的杂志也将会刊登这样一个封面:“共产主义能撑下来吗?”

(译者:主题思想:1、给中国的忠告,2、黑尼克松)




cite • 6 days ago
Is this article for real? The fact is, all Communist regimes inevitably collapse unless they transition toward democracy.

这篇文章是真的吗?事实是,所有的共产主义政权都不可避免要奔溃,除非它们转型成为民主政权。

Also, China's debt-to-gdp ratio is now over 280%, highest in the world (even higher than Japan). Little wonder hundreds of billions of dollars are fleeing to safe-havens outside of China.

同时,中国的GDP负债率现在超过了280%,是全球最高(甚至比日本还高)。毫无疑问数万亿美元会逃离到中国之外的金融避风港去。



Nikola Tasev Arcite • 6 days ago
You are skipping over the fact that China has not only debts, but also quite a lot of assets. It holds vast reserves of foreign reserves, including US debt.

你忽略了中国不仅有负债,但同时还有相当可观的资产这一事实。它有大量的外汇储备,包括美国国债。



wrleskovec Nikola Tasev • 3 days ago
The problem isn't their central government debt. It's heavy provincial and municipal debt combined with debt ridden private industry heavily reliant on foreign investment. US state level debt is almost non-existent and our private sector and municipal debt compares favorably.

问题并不在于他们中央政府的负债。问题在于沉重的省、市政府债务以及极度依赖外国投资的债务缠身的私营工业。美国州政府的债务几乎是0,而且我们私营部门以及市政府的债务相较之下还是较少的。



ChuSez Arcite • 4 days ago
The internal contradictions of Communism will inevitably lead to China's collapse.
Meanwhile we will sell the Communists the rope with which they will hang themselves.

共产主义的内在矛盾不可避免地会导致中国的崩溃。
与此同时我们会出售给共产党人给他们用来上吊自杀的身子。
Or something like that... 😆
或者其他差不多的东西......



NicolasBourbaki Arcite • 2 days ago
I guess you like pulling stuff out of your a$$. No one knows how much the debt to GDP ratio is in China. The official figure is 41% but no one knows if that is accurate.

我猜你肯定是喜欢从你的屁股里拉出东西来(指LS胡说八道且臭不可闻)。没人知道中国的GDP负债率是多少。官方数字是41%但是没人知道它是否准确。



Joe333 Arcite • 2 days ago
Democracy has nothing to do with anything
They collapse because it is a bad economic model
Much like the Fiat currency that we adopted that constantly booms and busts and will eventually crash completely.

民主制度和这些东西都无关
他们崩溃是因为坏的经济模型
很像我们采用的总是繁荣、衰退并最终会完全崩坏的法定货币。



RobertSF Joe333 • 2 days ago
You realize that, when we were on the gold standard, recessions were much more frequent and far more severe? Booms and busts? You should have seen the 19th century, except back then, they didn't call them recessions. They called them "panics."

(回楼上)当以前我们处于金本位制度时,经济衰退更频繁而且也更严重,这你意识到了吗?大繁荣接着大萧条?你应该回去看看19世纪,不过那时,他们并不称呼为经济衰退,而是称呼为“恐慌”



boonteetan • 5 days ago
Under such a discouraging circumstance of economic slowdown, many Chinese would have some feeling of melancholy especially those who have been making good money several years ago. Getting more stressful? Maybe temporarily.

在这样一个经济减缓阴影笼罩的的环境下,许多中国人都将会有些忧郁的情绪,尤其是那些过去几年来赚了大笔钱的人。会有更大的压力?或许只是暂时的。



PCCHK • 4 days ago
Erroneously referring to China as a superpower impairs rational analysis and policymaking. It also stokes China's already outsized and unhealthy nationalistic impulses. Yes, China has a big economy. However, it is still very poor on a per capita basis and it carries almost no weight in any other strategic area (military, political, educational, scientific, cultural). The author's credibility is undermined by casually labelling a country a superpower when it clearly is not.

错误地将中国比作超级大国让这篇文章的分析和决策的逻辑性有了瑕疵。而且这篇文章还吹鼓中国业已规模巨大的病态的民族主义冲动。是的,中国是一个大经济体。但是,其人均GDP仍然十分之低,而且在其他战略领域几乎无足轻重(军事,政治,教育,科学,文化)。这名作者随意地将本就不是超级大国的的国家当作超级大国,其本人的可信度实在让人质疑。(原来我们中国除了经济以外一无是处啊...)



cdog1984 PCCHK • 2 days ago
Yeah, much like the United States in the early twentieth century was not seen as much of a super power.

对,这和美国在二十世纪早期并不被人们视为超级大国是一样的。



rwisrael • 4 days ago
The lesson was that top down central government regulation doesn't work except to contract the economy.

给我们的启示是,除了让经济收缩以外,自上而下的中央政府根本不起作用。



RobertSF rwisrael • 2 days ago
And when China was growing like gangbusters, what was the lesson?

但是当中国势如破竹一般成长时,这个启示又是什么?



rwisrael RobertSF • a day ago
The lesson was that allowing entrepeneurs to keep the profits from their work would encourage growth. It worked too.

这给我们的启示是,允许企业家不断的从他们的工作中获得利润可以促进经济的增长。这也确实起到了作用。



stella blue • 4 days ago
I wish someone would deregulate and lower taxes now.

我希望有人能够放宽管制并且降低赋税。



reaganite88 • 3 days ago
Good article although it overstates the comparisons between a capitalist society that had 30 years of a partial top down approach brought on by the necessity of organizing for WWII and an agraian communist system that has only had about 50 years experience with some capitalistic reforms.
But the experience of going from high growth to low growth economies will likely be the same.

这篇文章很好,虽然它对于一个拥有由于二战时期组织的必要性,而发展过来的部分自上而下法30年实践经验的资本主义社会和区区只有50年实践经验的夹杂了一些资本主义气息改革的农耕共产主义社会,这两者间的比较有些夸大的成分。
但是,每个经济体在其经济增长速度由快变慢的过程中,经历的事情都是差不多的。



cdog1984 • 2 days ago
Of course the first of full-throated revolt out in the hinterlands once the masses deem mandate of heaven is lost is a part of the ruling party's tight rope walk that Nixon didn't have to deal with. Makes the transition from new economy, blazing fast growth to mature, ho hum growth even tougher.

当然,一旦民众认为GCD失去了其天命,那么第一个呼声最响的揭竿起义地区必是内陆,而这只是GCD头疼的一部分,不过尼克松那时可不必担心这些。从而让中国经济从快速增长向稳定增长的过程变得更加困难。



TotoCatcher • 2 days ago
China is a communist dictatorship. What you see is what communism is. It can't evolve. It can't respond.
And who is envying China? A fool might. But no reasonable person would envy them. Its a corrupt toxic polluted mess.

中国是一个共产主义独裁政体。你看到的中国问题不过就是共产主义会产生的问题。共产主义不能够对问题进行推展也不能够作出反应。

而且会有谁在妒忌中国?不过是个愚蠢的想法。没有一个有脑子的人会去妒忌他们。中国不过是个既腐败有毒又产生污染的废物。



Troll_in_Training TotoCatcher • 2 days ago
On the contrary - The CCP has held on for as long as it has because it is very good at adapting. The problem is that it has promised it's people that it would keep providing economic growth of the past 20 years in return for tolerating its heavy handedness and civil rights violations. When it can't deliver, it's going to be in trouble.

(回楼上)正好相反-中国GCD从诞生起就一直存活到了现在,因为它的适应力非常之强。问题是:中国GCD对中国国民承诺过,他们会继续提供过去20年来的经济增长,而作为回报,中国国民要忍受中国GCD的高压以及人权侵犯。当这个承诺流产的时候,麻烦就大了。



RobertSF GloriousCause • 2 days ago
No, communism is not beyond evil. What happened is that, as JFK said, "When you make peaceful revolution impossible, you make violent revolution inevitable." That's exactly what happened in Russia, China, Cuba, etc. And situations like are ripe for take-over by ruthless psychopaths. That's true whether the system is capitalist or communist.

不对,共产主义没有坏到骨子里。就像肯尼迪说过的那样“那些使和平改革成为不可能的人,必会使暴力革命成为可能。”这才是在俄罗斯,中国还有古巴等地发生的事情。另外当时的时机已经很成熟就等着那些无情的疯子出手了。无论是资本主义还是共产主义都是一样的。



Stone Soup • 2 days ago
Stop pumping money into expansionist schemes that involve building Naval forces and protecting far-away places. Kow-tow to Western (U.S.) interests and be glad we still let you fish in the seas.

不要再给那些建造用来保护遥远地方海军的扩张主义诡计送钱了 。给西方(美国)利益下跪上贡然后感激我们让你们在海里捕鱼吧。



CitizenAusterity • 2 days ago
It took Reagan to get the country back on track.

他们用了里根这样的人才让这个国家回到正轨



Mean_Girl CitizenAusterity • 2 days ago
"on track" == exploiting the poor and middle class.

“回到正轨”==剥削穷人和中产阶级。



CitizenAusterity Mean_Girl • 2 days ago
Explain this exploitation.

说明一下你所谓的剥削。



Mister Anderson CitizenAusterity • 2 days ago
US national debt tripled under Reagan, and Reagan was also a treasonous traitor who sold weapons to US enemies to fund terrorism in South America, in violation of congressional orders, and then took the coward's way out and let others in his administration take the fall. If that's "back on track" then you have an odd definition of success.

美国国债在里根任期内翻了3番,他还是个卖武器给美国的敌人来资助南美恐怖主义的叛徒,那个懦夫违反了国会命令之后就跑了还让其他人来承担责任。如果这就是“回到正轨”那你对成功的定义还真是奇怪。


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