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译者:unknown     发布时间:2014-07-18     超过 0 位网友阅读



Five Ways China Spies


Image: Flickr/Franco Folini. CC BY-SA 2.0. 
Every time a fleeing or exiled Chinese officialor public intellectual issues a warning about Chinese spies, the statements attain an immediate significance. When ousted Beijing Universityprofessor and Cato Institute visiting fellow Xia Yeliang made such remarks onFebruary 27, press the world over picked up his remarks.Dr. Xia said “Every year among those top universities there are some visitingscholars, and among them I can definitely say there are some people who areactually spies…They don’t doany research—probably they just do some surveys fortheir boss.”


One of the reasons such remarks garner attention is that amystique surrounds Chinese intelligence. The Chinese have not faced thesame exposure that the Russians faced when Westerners helpeddefectors like Oleg Gordievsky, Vasili Mitrokhin, and Sergei Tretyakov write about the Soviet KGB and its successors.The shroud of mystery has meant Western observers treat Chinese intelligence asa kind of inscrutable beast, operating in fundamentally different ways thantheir Western and Russian counterparts. However, security services worldwidehave uncovered a wide-ranging and familiar set of operational methods used byChinese intelligence.


One ofthe reasons Chinese intelligence operations do not seem to make sense toobservers is that they mistake intelligence for the theft of secrets. Intelligence does not mean the acquisition of “classified” or “secret”information. Intelligence is the acquisition and processing of information thatassists in formulating policy and guiding action. Classification has nothing todo with it; Beijing’s concerns do. China concerns in theUnited States go beyond U.S. policy, including overseas Chinesepopulations, democracy activists, counterintelligence, and scientificexpertise. And, as will become clear below, theChinese seem to be very comfortable with merely secondhand access to sensitiveinformation. Here arefive important and unmistakably familiar ways that China collects foreignintelligence.


1. Diplomats, Defense Attachés, and Journalists


Whoever said China spies in a fundamentally different way than others in thespy business got it wrong. Concealing spies within the embassy staff—the bread-and-butter of international espionage—has been and continues to be a hallmark of Chinese intelligenceoperations. In the past, these officially- or quasi-officially coveredintelligence officers have laid low, focusing on eliciting information frominteresting contacts rather than trying to recruit them. But that appears tohave changed in recent years.


A little over three years ago, Sweden convicted a Uighur refugee, BaiburMaihesuti, from China of spying on other refugees inside and outsidethe country. His Chinese case officers were a journalist anddiplomat, who paid him in exchange fortelephone numbers, travel patterns,and other personal information about his fellow Uighurs. Around the same time,German officials also expressed concern that Chinese intelligence officers wereoperating more aggressively out of their diplomatic facilities.Although it might seem odd to a Western audience for a journalist to beassociated with an embassy, Chinese journalists are state employees, givingthem no deniability if they are caught in themiddle of an operation.

就在三年前,瑞典审判了一位名叫‘百部 买 合苏 提’的中国间谍,她以维 族难民的身份逃至这个国家。来为他办案的人员是位记者和外交官,付钱给他来换取电话号,通过这种方式,得到了他的维吾尔同胞的个人信息。与此同时,德国官员还担心,中国情报人员会进一步动用外交手段,西方观众可能对记者和大使馆之间的联系似乎感到奇怪,中国记者是国有企业的员工,如果他们在活动过程中被抓,他们是不会相互推诿的。 

2. Seeding Operations


Chinese intelligence services have been trying to feed intelligence officersand recruited agents into the adversary’s organizationssince the 1920s. In fact, China’s first espionageheroes were the so-called “Three Heroes of the Dragon’s Lair,” who infiltrated the Kuomintang’s intelligence apparatus. When a senior Chinese Communist Party(CCP) official defected, these three officers sounded the warning that allowedthe CCP to survive. While communist intelligence employed this method withsuccess throughout the Chinese Civil War, seeding emerged only more recently inoperations against the United States.


Thefirst, and so far, only case to reach a U.S. courtroom was Glenn DuffieShriver, who Chinese intelligence recruited in 2004 while he was in Shanghai.In exchange for $70,000, Shriver made several attempts to join the StateDepartment and then the CIA’s National Clandestine Service. CIA’sbackground check, however, alerted security officials that something was notquite right, and further investigation revealed the connection to Chineseintelligence.


Shriverhowever probably was not the first such Chinese effort against the UnitedStates. In 1997, then-FBI counterintelligence chief Harry Godfrey III warnedthat “We haveseen cases where [Chinese intelligence] have encouraged people to apply to theCIA, the FBI, and Naval Investigative Service, andother Defense agencies.”


3.Academics and Scholars


It is a well-known fact that China’s intelligenceapparatus manages several think tanks to do research and analysisas well as consult with foreign officials and scholars. The most famous andbiggest are the Ministry of State Security-run China Institutes of ContemporaryInternational Relations (CICIR) and military intelligence-affiliated ChinaInstitute for International Strategic Studies (CIISS) thateach have dozens of researchers. The current MSS chief, Geng Huichang, builthis career as a researcher at CICIR, rising to be its presidentin the early 1990s. And the CIISS president has always been a senior member ofmilitary intelligence—most often the serving DeputyChief of Staff with the foreign-affairs portfolio or his immediate predecessor—currently General Sun Jianguo. Their academiccredentials makes them a valuable way to reach out to retired foreign officialsand nongovernment policy analysts to get information on other countries byhosting conferences, Track II dialogues, and academic delegations.This kind of collection is nothing too nefarious, but it does get China accessto a lot of gossip, the thinking of future officials, and other nonpublic,if still unclassified information. For the most part, these “spies” are exactly who they say they are:Chinese intelligence officers with a scholarly job description.


ButChinese intelligence services also use academic and policy researchinstitutions to hide clandestine operations. Research offers a useful excuse tocommission research, hide suspicious travel, and engage a wide variety ofofficials. Scholars are naturally curious and are expected to ask questions.For example, Japanese police investigated an intelligence officer based in theChinese embassy’s economics section in Tokyo in the late 2000s. Prior to working atthe embassy, the military intelligence officer worked at the China Academy ofSocial Sciences, one of China’s most prominent thinktanks. Against the United States, one of the intelligence officers believed tobe involved in handling convicted spy, Chi Mak, worked as a researcher at auniversity in Guangzhou, capital of Guangdong Province.

然而中国情报部门还利用学术和政策研究机构来进行隐蔽的秘密行动。做研究变成了一个很实用的借口,(它能)隐藏可疑的行踪还能广泛接触各类官员。而且学者天性好奇而且会问问题。例如 2000年之前 ,日本东京警方调查的一名所属中国大使馆经济科的情报员。这名军事情报员在大使馆的工作之前,曾在在中国社会科学院工作,(这家学院)是中国最著名的智囊团。在美国,有位情报人员叫Chi Mak,他被认为参与并受操纵而被判间谍罪,他曾在广州的一所大学里作一名研究员。 

4. Local Government Offices


Inside China, intelligence officials need little in the way of cover andsometimes having the overt power of the government comes in handy whenconfronting potential agents. A former security official in Tianjin, HaoFengjun, told Taiwanese press that China’s intelligenceservices use local government credentials—often linked only to a numbered but unnamed office—to approach businessmen and officials when they find themselves onthe other side of the law. For example, the MSS periodically sweeps brothels andkaraoke parlors to pick up businessmen, especially those from Taiwan, and these“local government officials”would offer assistance and a way out through espionage. At other times, these “officials” threaten to close down Taiwanesebusinesses and confiscate the investment unless the businessmen agree to assistChinese intelligence. Although only a few cases of such blackmail are known—most notably a Japanese code clerk in Shanghai—this offer of assistance to fix someone’stroubles before sending them home to spy appears tobe China’s routine approach to spyingon Taiwan.


5. Businesspeople at Home and Abroad


Accordingto a widely cited Hong Kong press article, Chinese military intelligenceemploys “commercial cadres” who operate like case officers despite not being officialgovernment employees. The businesspersons have government credentials and helpintelligence officials recruit foreigners that might possess valuableinformation. One such person may have introduced KuoTai-shen, a naturalized U.S. citizen and Louisiana-based businessmanarrested in 2008 for spying, to a Chinese intelligence official with theGuangzhou Friendship Association that promoted U.S.-China business ties. Afterbeing recruited himself, Kuo then recruited two U.S. Defense Departmentofficials, Gregg Bergersen and James Fondren, to provide him sensitive defenseinformation related U.S. concerns in the Asia-Pacific.


Chinaalso hides intelligence officers overseas using commercial cover—sometimes allowing them toemigrate and gain legitimate foreign documentation. Last year, Taiwanesecounterintelligence (with U.S. assistance) uncovered a high-level penetrationin Taiwan’s military. A Chinese intelligenceofficer living as an Australian businesswoman in Thailand handled General LoHsien-che—director of armytelecommunications and electronic information at the time of his arrest—while he posted in Thailand as a military attaché in the early 2000s. She and/or another Chinese intelligence officerreportedly lured Lo into a situation where he could be blackmailed and thenoffered to pay him thousands of dollars in exchange for cooperating withChinese intelligence.

中国为了隐藏海外情报人员会利用商业身份作掩护——有时会允许他们移民海外,以获得合法的海外身份。去年,台湾反情报部门(在美国的协助下)发现台湾军方高层被渗透。一名中国情报人员以澳大利亚女商人身份在泰国操纵罗贤哲——在他被捕之前是名陆军通信与电子信息主管——早在2000年他的职位就是泰国的一名军官。她和/或另一个中国的情报官员设局利诱 罗 ,当他受到利诱之后支付给他数千美元作为交换条件,(迫使他)与中国情报部门进行合作。 

PeterMattis is a Fellow in the Jamestown Foundation’s China Program and a PhDstudent in Politics and International Studies at the University of Cambridge.



Lambert1958 (March 6, 2014 -2:45am) All these listed in the articleare very common methods used globly and not exclusively by ChineseGovernment.So other countries are no less malicious than us. If thisserves as a good reason to be blamed for, it is not persuading enough.


LProulx (March 6, 2014 - 7:15am) That seems to be the author'spoint; Chinese espionage is not so mysterious or so exotic. The piece shows that,if we want to understand it, we do not need to listen to loudmouths saying thesky is falling. Hard to see that China is being blamed here


sd989 (March 6, 2014 - 10:27pm) Basically, the author's point isthat anyone that is Chinese is a potential spy.


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